Heidegger M. Logic: The Question of Truth

Indiana University Press, 2010. — 371 p.Martin Heidegger's 1925–26 lectures on truth and time provided much of the basis for his momentous work, Being and Time. Not published until 1976 as volume 21 of the Complete Works, three months before Heidegger's death, this work is central to Heidegger's overall project of reinterpreting Western thought in terms of time and truth. The text shows the degree to which Aristotle underlies Heidegger's hermeneutical theory of meaning. It also contains Heidegger’s first published critique of Husserl and takes major steps toward establishing the temporal bases of logic and truth. Thomas Sheehan's elegant and insightful translation offers English-speaking readers access to this fundamental text for the first time.Translator’s ForewordThe first, most literal meaning of the word “logic”
A first indication of the concept of the subject matter of “logic”
A philosophizing logic and traditional scholastic logic
The possibility and the being of truth in general Skepticism
Outline of the course Bibliography
Prolegomenon: The contemporary situation of philosophical logic (Psychologism and the question of truth)
Psychologism: the name and the concept
Husserl’s critique of psychologism
Some preliminaries of the critique
Demonstration of the fundamental errors
The presuppositions of Husserl’s critique: a specific concept of truth as the guiding idea
The roots of these presuppositions
Anti-critical questions The need to take the question of the essence of truth back to Aristotle
Why must the critique of psychologism be a critique of psychology?
What positive contribution does the phenomenological investigation of psychologism make to the question of the concept and interpretation of the phenomenon of truth?
The connection between propositional and intuitional truth The need to return to Aristotle
The problem of truth in the decisive origins of philosophical logic, and the seedbed of traditional logic (focused on Aristotle)
Prefatory remark
The place of truth, and λόγoς (proposition)
The basic structure of λόγoς and the phenomenon of making sense
The as-structure of our primary way of understanding: the hermeneutical “as”
The modification of the as-structure in the act of determining: the apophantic “as”
The conditions of the possibility of λόγoς being false The question of truth
Preparatory interpretation Metaphysics IV and VI , and De interpretatione
Truth and being Interpretation of Metaphysics IX
The three conditions for the possibility of a statement being false, taken in their interconnection
The presupposition for Aristotle’s interpretation of truth as the authentic determination of being
The radicalized question: What is truth? (A retrieval of the analysis of falsehood in terms of its ur-temporality)
The idea of a phenomenological chronology
The conditions of the possibility of falsehood within the horizon of the analysis of existence
Care as the being of existence Concern-for and concern-about, authenticity and inauthenticity
The ur-temporality of care
Preparatory considerations toward attaining an original understanding of time A return to the history of the philosophical interpretation of the concept of time
Hegel’s interpretation of time in the Encyclopaedia
The influence of Aristotle on Hegel’s and Bergson’s interpretation of time
A preliminary look at the meaning of time in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
The interpretation of time in the Transcendental Analytic
An explanation of the notions “form” and “intuition”
The constitutive moments of ordering
Form of intuition and formal intuition
Space and time as given infinite magnitudes; quantum and quantitas in Kant’s interpretation
The function of time in the Transcendental Logic A characterization of the problematic
The question of the unity of nature
The original a priori of all combining— the transcendental unity of apperception
Time as the universal a priori form of all appearances
Time as original pure self-affection
The question about the connection between time as original self-affection and the “I think”
Interpretation of the First Analogy of Experience in the light of our interpretation of time
The schematism of the pure concepts of the understanding
Sensibilization of appearances
Sensibilization of empirical sensible concepts
Sensibilization of pure sensible concepts
Image and schema
Sensibilization of the pure concepts of understanding
Number as the schema of quantity
Sensation as the schema of reality
Persistence as the schema of substance
The time-determination of the synthesis speciosa
The now-structure that we have attained: its character of referral and of making present The phenomenal demonstrability and limits of Kant’s interpretation of time
Time as an existential of human existence— temporality and the structure of care The statement as a making-present
Editor’s Afterword
Glossaries
Abbreviations