Cambridge University Press, 2004. - 402 p.Over the last fifteen years, Michael Smith has written a series of essays about the nature of belief and desire, the status of normative judgement, and the relevance of the views we take on both these topics to the accounts we give of our nature as free and responsible agents. This long-awaited collection comprises some of the most influential of Smith’s essays. Among the topics covered are: the Humean theory of motivating reasons, the nature of normative reasons,Williams andKorsgaard on internal and external reasons, the nature of self-control, weakness of will, compulsion, freedom, responsibility, the analysis of our rational capacities, moral realism, the dispositional theory of value, the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, the error theory, rationalist treatments of moral judgement, the practicality requirement on moral judgement, and cognitivist versus non-cognitivist accounts of moral judgement. Collected for the first time in a single volume, the essays will be of interest to students in philosophy and psychology. Michael Smith is Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University.
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